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NOVELTY AND REDUCTION TO PRACTICE:
PATENT CONFUSION
The rewards of a patent monopoly are reserved for contributions
which may significantly increase existing knowledge. 1 Under the present
law, an applicant must show not only that his device was an "inven-
tion ' 2 and had "utility,"3 but also that it meets the requirement of
"novelty. ' 4 The prerequisite of novelty reflects a basic policy of the
1. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966); Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket
Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950); Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1882).
2. A statutory test of invention is provided for by 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1964):
Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter.
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as
a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability
shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.
Section 103 was intended to codify the judicial test of patentable "invention" and to
maintain the level of innovation at the pre-1952 standard. Graham v. John Deere Co.,
supra note 1. In that case the Court reaffirmed the test of invention formulated in
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850), which required that a patentable
invention evidence more ingenuity and skill than that possessed by the ordinary technician
in the applicable art.
3. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1964): Inventions Patentable.
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Section 101 insures that naked ideas, independent of means for their implementation,
cannot be patented. See, e.g., Lyman v. Ladd, 347 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (mathematical
apportionment, independent of specific structure, not patentable); In re Patton, 29 C.C.P.A.
(Patents) 982, 127 F.2d 324 (1942) (abstract idea or theory, regardless of importance, not
patentable unless accompanied by means of implementation). While bare theories or ideas
are denied recognition because they lack means of effectuation, utility is not predicated on
physical instrumentality alone. Thus, in the chemical field a patent will not be granted
on a working process if the product of that process has no use. Brenner v. Manson, 383
U.S. 519 (1966).
4. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1964):
Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss of right to patent.
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention
thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a
foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior
to the date of the application for patent in the United States, or
(c) he has abandoned the invention, or
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law to reward only those inventors who first place the device in the
public domain.5 If knowledge of the subject sought to be patented has
already been made available to the public, then a patent grant would
not only serve no useful purpose,6 but would injure the public by
removing existing knowledge from the public domain.7
The novelty requirement is spelled out in Section 102(a)8 of the
Patent Act of 1952: a patent will be barred for lack of novelty if the
invention had previously been described in a prior patent or printed
publication, or if it had been "known or used by others." While prior
patents and printed publications are relatively clear categories, the
"known or used by others" obstacle is ill-defined; read expansively, it
would bar any invention which had previously been thought of-how-
ever vaguely-by someone else. To prevent yesterday's science-fiction
from becoming today's patent bar, courts have long read the statutory
language restrictively. An invention was not "known or used" unless
it had been actually reduced to practice," by building a working and
(d) the invention was first patented or caused to be patented by the applicant or
his legal representatives or assigns in a foreign country prior to the date of the applica-
tion for patent in this country on an application filed more than twelve months
before the filing of the application in the United States, or
(e) the invention was described in a patent granted on an application for patent by
another filed in the United States before the invention thereof by the applicant for
patent, or
(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented, or
(g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made in this country
by another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. In determining
priority of invention there shall be considered not only the respective dates of con-
ception and reduction to practice of the invention, but also the reasonable diligence
of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to
conception by the other.
An invention is said to lack patentable novelty under section 102 if it has been "antid-
pated" by a prior device which contains all the elements of the invention and which
performs substantially the same work in substantially the same way. A discovery is, there-
fore, anticipated if the prior art discloses a substantially identical earlier innovation.
Patentable "invention," however, is not defined in terms of anticipation; a device is said
to lack invention under section 103 when its design or operation would have been obvious.
Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Heckethorn Mfg. & Supply Co., 332 F.2d 406, 414-15 (6th Cir.
1964); Allied Wheel Prods., Inc. v. Rude, 206 F.2d 752, 760 (6th Cir. 1953).
5. 1 RoBINsON, LAiw OF PATENrs § 221 (1890); see also Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10
How.) 477, 496-97 (1850).
6. Authorities cited note 5 supra.
7. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
8. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1964), supra note 4. The substance of section 102(a) has been
in the patent laws since their inception in 1790. 1 Stat. 110 (1790); 1 Stat. 319 (1793);
5 Stat. 119 (1836); 16 Stat. 201 (1870); REv. STAT. § 4886 (1874); 35 U.S.C. § 31 (1946);
35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1952).
9. E.g., Stearns v. Tinker & Rasor, 220 F.2d 49, 56 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
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tested embodiment, 0 or constructively reduced to practice, by filing a
detailed patent application, which later ripened into a patent." And it
was not known or used "by others" unless the inventor had made knowl-
edge of his device available to the public. 1 2
This interpretation has been upset by a recent decision of the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals, In re Borst, 3 which may severely
tighten the requirement of novelty. The court rejected four of Borst's
claims relating to a neutron amplifier, citing as the sole prior ref-
erence a 1947 Atomic Energy Commission secret memorandum. The
idea in the memorandum had been neither actually nor constructively
reduced to practice.' 4 Rejecting these requirements as "illogical" and
"anomolous," the court held the amplifier had been "known or used"
because the memorandum had described the device in detail; 1 and it
had been "known or used by others" because the Atomic Energy Act1"
830 (1955); Block v. Nathan Anklet Support Co., 9 F.2d 311, 312-18 (2d Cir. 1925), In re
Schlittler, 43 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 986, 992, 234 F.2d 882, 886 (1956).
10. See, e.g., Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chemical Corp., 276 U.S. 358, 383 (1928);
Coffin v. Ogden, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 120, 124 (1873). While the foregoing authorities make
it clear that abandoned experiments are not reductions to practice, they cannot be con-
strued to hold that the mere production of a chemical compound is sufficient to establish
a reduction to practice; frequently tests will be required to demonstrate utility. Blicke v.
Treves, 44 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 753, 756-57, 241 F.2d 718, 720 (1957). See Note, The Legally
Complete Invention-A Study of the Requirement of Testing to Establish an Actual
Reduction to Practice, 3 Go. WASH. L. Rxv. 740 (1965).
11. In re Schlittler, supra note 9, at 992, 234 F.2d at 886. Thus, if the application is
withdrawn or rejected it does not constitute a constructive reduction to practice. Id.
at 990, 234 F.2d at 885.
12. See Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1829); cf. 85 U.S.C. § 102 (1964)
(Reviser's Note). While a constructive reduction to practice constitutes an anticipation
from the date of application and not the date of issuance, 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (1964), it Is
not, strictly speaking, publicly accessible from the time of filing. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1964).
However, the applicant has done all he can 'to make his discovery known when he files, and
it, therefore, appears correct to disregard the delays of the Patent Office in issuing the
patent. Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co., 270 U.S. 390, 401 (1926). Once
the patent issues, all secrets disclosed therein fall into the public domain. Nat'l Welding
Equip. Co. v. Hammon Precision Equip. Co., 165 F. Supp. 788, 795 (N.D. Cal. 1958).
13. 52 C.C.P.A. (Patents) -, 345 F.2d 851 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 973 (1966).
14. In fact the document was prefaced by a statement that it embodied an idea which,
if it worked, would have wide implications in the field of applied atomic energy. Brief
for Appellant, p. 10, In re Borst, supra note 13.
15. In so holding, the court rejected the long established rule, recently considered and
reaffirmed in In re Schlittler, supra note 9, that "known or used" requires knowledge of
an invention that has been completed by reduction to practice, actual or constructive.
Id. at 992, 234 F.2d at 886-87. Schittler was expressly overruled to the extent it required
such a reduction. Borst, supra note 13, at -, 845 F.2d at 854-55.
16. 68 Stat. 947 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2185 (1964):
In connection with applications for patents covered by this Chapter, the fact that
the invention or discovery was known or used before shall be a bar to the patenting
of such invention or discovery even though such prior knowledge or use was under
secrecy within the atomic energy program of the United States.
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provided that such secret memoranda were constructively accessible to
the public.17 Hence, Borst's claims lacked novelty.
The decision expressly recognized that the 1947 disclosure did not
constitute a "publication" within the meaning of the patent law.'8
Thus Borst may create a new category of disclosures--unpublished yet
publicly accessible memoranda-which will serve as a bar to patents.
Of course, the courts may limit Borst to the unique statutory category
of Atomic Energy Commission discoveries. But if Borst is applied out-
side this narrow preserve, it may create a major new barrier to patent-
ability.19
17. In re Borst, supra note 13, at -, 45 F.2d at 854. In view of its decision that
section 155 eliminates the requirement of public accessibility for prior knowledge or use
produced under secrecy within the atomic energy program, the court found it unnecessary
to decide whether the memorandum was publicly available upon the date of dedassifica-
tion. Id. Whether it was accessible at that time is doubtful. Cf. Ex parte Suozzi, 125
U.S.P.Q. 445 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1959) (government employees received research report in
their official capacities and not as members of the general public). Moreover, since section
155 permitted the court to hold that the disclosure did not have to be publicly accessible,
the C.C.P.A. was able to preserve that portion of Schlittler which reaffirmed the public
accessibility rule. In re Borst, supra note 13, at -, 345 F.2d at 854.
18. In re Borst, supra note 13, at -, 345 F.2d at 853.
19. The Borst decision potentially increases the number of section 102(a) bars to which
defendants in infringement actions, 35 U.S.C.A. § 282 (Supp. 1965), and patent examiners
in application proceedings may have reference. For example, under pre-Borst decisions an
invention could not be "known" unless it was reduced to practice, and hence it could not
be known by others in this country-as required by section 102(a) and its predecessors-
unless it was reduced to practice in the United States. E.g., Westinghouse Mach. Co. v.
General Electric Co., 207 Fed. 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1913); City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge.
Inc., 69 F.2d 577, 589 (7th Cir. 1934). Borst, however, eliminates the need for a reduction
to practice, and focuses on the disclosure itself. Thus, if there is a Borst.type disclosure
to others in the United States of an invention which was reduced to practice abroad,
the geographical restriction in section 102(a) would appear to be satisfied.
Like foreign reductions, applications which are withdrawn or for some other reason
do not ripen into patents have traditionally been denied the status of anticipations. In re
Schlittler, supra note 9, at 990, 234 F.2d at 885; The Corn-Planter Patent, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.)
181, 210-11 (1874). One justification for this treatment of such "abandoned applications"
is that they are usually not made accessible to the public. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1964). But after
Borst, an abandoned application, which is often a complete description of an invention,
would be effective as a bar if the applicant makes it publicly accessible. See Note, 19
GEo. VAsH. L. REv. 73 (1950); 66 CoLuar. L. Rnv. 394, 399 (1966).
While Borst's impact on foreign reductions and abandoned applications is significant,
it should be noted that both could previously, by a disclosure in a printed publication,
be converted into references which would bar patentability. This is possible since printed
publications are not subject to geographical or subject matter restrictions. See Westing-
house Mach. Co. v. General Electric Co., supra, at 78. Even the Patent Office recognized
that an abandoned application could be published. See Note, 66 CoLu.t. L. RM,. 394,
399 (1966). Borst merely does away with the requirement of disclosing such foreign reduc.
ions and abandoned applications in a printed publication.
Unpublished descriptions do more than increase the number of section 102(a) references.
Section 103 references, available to defeat a discovery for lack of invention, will also ap-
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The potential impact of Borst is its effect on the old rules for deter-
mining when a prior description would bar a patent. Before Borst, a
mere description of an idea or conception could defeat a claim of
novelty only if it were included in a "printed publication"2 0 or a
patent.21 These descriptions, and no others,22 were thought likely to
bring knowledge of the invention to the public. 23 And unless the public
knew of the earlier discovery, the subsequent invention would be con-
sidered novel.24
The "printed publication" clause has consistently been interpreted
in light of this purpose-to bar a patent only if the earlier invention
were known to society. At the time the statute was enacted,25 the
printing press was the only device for inexpensive reproduction of
documents. 26 As techniques have grown, courts have broadened the
definition of "printing" to include typewritten and mimeographed
documents deposited in public libraries .27 Provision for dissemination
pear more frequently since section 103 bars depend upon the state of the prior art as
defined by section 102. See, e.g., Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A.
1 at 20; H.R. RE. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1952); see also Hazeltine Researd,
Inc. v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 252 (1965), rehearing denied, 382 U.S. 1000 (1966).
20. The disclosure in a printed publication need not be based upon a working inven-
tion. E.g., The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 535-36 (1887); In re Shackcll, 39 C.C.P.A.
(Patents) 847, 856, 194 F.2d 720, 727, cert. denied, 343 U.S. 978 (1952). Like a patent,
however, it must contain a sufficient description to enable one skilled in the art to con-
struct the device. E.g., In re Legrice, 49 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1124, 1134, 801 F.2d 929, 936
(1962); Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 555 (1870).
21. Early patent statutes required that the applicant deliver a working model to the
Commissioner of Patents. E.g., Patent Act of 1836 § 6, 5 Stat. 119. The practice has since
been discarded. The Commissioner, however, is authorized to require a model or
specimen if, in his discretion, they are needed to demonstrate operativeness or for pur-
poses of experimentation. 35 U.S.C. § 114 (1964).
22. Thus even prior unpublished drawings could not negative novelty, no matter how
completely they disclosed the subject matter sought to be patented. 1 DELLER, WALKER
ON PATENTS § 70 (2d ed. 1964).
23. Patents after issuance are publicly accessible by statute. 35 U.S.C.A. § 41(a)(9)
(Supp. 1965); 35 U.S.C. § 11(a)(1) (1964); but see 35 U.S.C. § 181 (1964). Publications, by
definition, are publicly available. E.g., Badowski v. U.S., 143 Ct. Cl. 23, 28-30, 161 F. Supp.
252, 255-56 (1958). In re Tenney, 45 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 894, 254 F.2d 619 (1958), Cottler v.
Stimson, 20 Fed. 906, 910 (C.C.D. Ore. 1884); 1 DELT R, WALKER ON PATENTS § 60 (2d ed.
1964).
24. Authorities cited note 5 supra.
25. The term "printed publication" first appeared in the Patent Act of 1836, 5 Stat.
117 (1836). See generally, I.C.E. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 250 F. Supp. 788, 740-41
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
26. Gulliksen v. Halberg, 75 U.S.P.Q. 252, 258 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1937). Cf., Keene v.
Wheatley, 14 Fed. Cas. 180, 192-93 (No. 7644) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1861).
27. See, e.g., Gulliksen v. Halberg, supra note 26 (typewritten thesis a printed publica-
tion); Ex parte Herschberger, 96 U.S.P.Q. 54 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1952) (Ph.D. thesis,
partially typewritten and partially handwritten a printed publication); Hamilton Labs.,
Inc. v. Massengill, 111 F.2d 584, 585 (6th Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 688 (1940).
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of the knowledge is supplied by the "publication" requirement, under
which a printed document will not bar a patent unless it has been
made available to the public. 28 In Badowsli v. United States,2 for ex-
ample, the government challenged a patent by unearthing a Russian
document describing the device. The court found that the document
had been obtained in 1958 only after "months of diplomatic endeavor
by defendant's embassy in Moscow." 30 There was no evidence that it
had ever been accessible to the public in any country prior to the 1942
patent application; nor had the document been contained in any library
anywhere, even at the time of litigation. Consequently, the document
was held not to be a prior publication, and the patent was granted.
Similarly, private reports,3 1 confidential papers,32 and documents in-
tended for distribution solely within an organization 33 have all failed
the publication test. On the other hand, even a single copy of a typed
thesis meets the publication test if it has been deposited in a public
library.34
What Borst may do is to add another bar to novelty: a memorandum
describing an idea but which falls short of the requirements for printed
publication.3 Unless construed with care, the new bar to novelty may
prove a troublesome category.
While courts have been liberal in the case of the typewritten document, a single micro-
film copy has been excluded from the printed publication category of section 102. In re
Tenney, supra note 23. The Patent Office Board of Appeals, however, has permitted a
microfilm copy to bar a patent, distinguishing Tenney on the grounds that the microfilm
copy involved in that case was misclassified. Ex parte Garbo, 141 U.S.P.Q. 913, 915-16
(PaL Off. Bd. App. 1962). Cf. I.C.E. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., supra note 25.
28. Cases cited note 23 supra.
29. 143 Ct. CI. 23, 164 F. Supp. 252 (1958).
30. Id. at 28, 164 F. Supp. at 255.
31. E.g., Dow Chemical Co. v. Williams Bros. Well Treating Corp., 81 F.2d 495 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 690 (1936.
32. E.g., United Chromium, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 11 F. Supp. 694. 699 (D.
Conn. 1935), rev'd on other grounds, 85 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1936).
33. E.g., Ex parte Suozzi, supra note 17; but see Ex parte Brimm & Galley, 147 U.S.P.Q.
72 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1963).
34. E.g., Ex parte Herschberger, supra note 27; Gulliksen v. Halberg, supra note 26.
A single copy of a printed book has also satisfied the test. E.g., John Crossley & Sons.
Ltd. v. Hogg, 83 Fed. 488 (C.C.D. Mass. 1897); 1 ROBINSON, PAEnIS § 327 (1890). But see
Alexander Anderson, Inc. v. Eastman, 16 F. Supp. 513, 516-17 (S.D. Calif. 1936) (dictum),
appeal dismissed per stipulation, 94 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1938).
35. In view of the minimal dissemination and printing requirements for a publication,
see note 34 supra and accompanying text, future courts may regard most publicly avail-
able memoranda to be printed publications. This would not, however, foreclose all recog-
nition of -the Borst-type disclosure. A manuscript submitted to a publisher may be an
effective Borst-type disclosure from the time of its receipt, see Note, 66 CoLum. L. Ray. 394,
397-98 (1966), rather than a printed publication at a subsequent date. In re Schlittler,
supra note 9. Moreover, publicly available documents reproduced by techniques not
1966 1199
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First, Borst weakens the dissemination requirement for written
descriptions. Unpublished memoranda necessarily fall short of the level
of distribution demanded of publications, and yet the court left unclear
exactly what lesser requirement Borst-type disclosures must meet.30
If no significant dissemination is required severe damage may be done
to patent policy. Inventors may be discouraged from investing in an
idea if an obscure prior disclosure may lurk as a threat to patentability.
Moreover, there is no reasonable basis for denying the second inventor
a patent where the first invention was effectively kept from public
knowledge.37
Second, Borst-type disclosures may be used to avoid the goals of the
printed publication rule. Publishing involves effort; costs are high,
access to scientific journals limited, and libraries restrictive in what
they will allow deposited. Borst may tempt inventors to use the easier
method of protecting their discoveries from being patented by a later
inventor at the expense of the greater exchange of information provided
by publications.38
A more serious defect is that the Borst-type disclosure avoids the time
limit which patent law imposes on printed publications. Under §
102(b),39 an inventor loses his patent rights if he does not file an appli-
cation within one year of publication, public use or sale or patenting
of the device.40 Borst-type disclosures, being none of these, do not fall
presently considered to constitute "printing," e.g., In re Tenney, supra note 23 (microfilm
copy), can qualify as Borst-type disclosures since the court did not restrict its new section
102(a) category to printed materials.
36. The court was not forced to formulate a test of dissemination for Borst-type dis.
closures since it found that the A.E.C. document was exempted by statute from the
public accessibility requirement. See notes 16, 17 supra and accompanying text.
37. Cf. authorities cited note 5 supra. Moreover, a Borst.type bar which does not
present some degree of public availability could not be reconciled with the rule that a
later inventor will be held to have constructive notice of the prior art. See, e.g., Mast.
Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 494 (1900).
38. Such a result would contravene one of the purposes of the patent law: the en-
couragement of dissemination of new ideas. See Universal Oil Products Co. v. Globe Oil
& Refining Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944); Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 533 (1966),
39. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1964), supra note 4.
40. The purpose of this one-year rule is to induce prompt filing of patents, thus
insuring an early date at which the public can practice the invention without fear of In-
fringement actions. An inventor is not permitted to extend his seventeen year monopoly,
35 U.S.C.A. § 154 (Supp. 1965), by exploiting his device and then filing -to bar the field
against all others. See, e.g., Ushakoff v. U.S., 164 Ct. Cl. 455, 460, 827 F.2d 669, 672 (1964);
Warner & Swasey Co. v. Universal Marion Corp., 237 F. Supp. 719, 724 (D. Colo. 1964),
afd, 354 F.2d 541 (10th Cir. 1965); cf. Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 19 (1829),
While section 102(b) imposes a strict one-year rule, courts have recognized that it cannot
be invoked when the inventor is engaged in reasonable experimentation. Smith & Grlggs
Mfg. Co. v. Sprague, 123 U.S. 249, 256 (1887). This is true even if the inventor experi-
mented before the public. Elizabeth v. Payment Co., 97 US. 126 (1877).
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within the one year rule.41 The decision may thus defeat the policy of
this section by enabling inventors to enjoy the pre-patent fruits of dis-
covery with the security that a later inventor cannot gain a patent, but
without effectively bringing their ideas before the public. 42
Finally, Borst-type disclosures contain no assurances that the device is
of any worth43 -assurances which other methods of barring patents all
possess. An actual reduction to practice proves an invention works.44
Constructive reductions-the filing of patent applications-are not
likely to be based on mere conjecture. Not only do filinglo and attor-
ney fees exert a sobering effect, but the Commissioner of Patents
may require a working model of an invention whose operativeness
appears doubtful.4 Printing expenses, or the scrutiny of publishers
and editors, help assure that purely frivolous claims are not likely to
be found in printed publications. Moreover, the scientific community
is likely to judge irresponsible representations harshly; the risk of repu-
tation helps insure that discoveries revealed in publication are of practi-
cal benefit.
None of these deterrents to conjecture apply to Borst-type disclosures.
An unpublished but publicly available memorandum carries no in-
41. The Borst-type disclosure is unlikely, moreover, to provoke printed publications,
public uses, or sales by third parties, which will invoke the application of the one-year
rule, see, e.g., A. Schrader's Sons, Inc. v. Wein Sales Corp., 9 F.2d 306, 307-08 (2d Cir.
1925), since those skilled in the art are unlikely to see a disclosure which is not available
to them upon reasonable investigation.
42. The Borst-type disclosure would be particularly tempting to the discoverer of an
idea which, owing to existing technological lags, is not presently commercially acceptable.
The disclosure would bar all others seeking patents and yet would not, by itself, invoke
section 102(b). Thus, the inventor would be free to postpone filing and to await industrial
acceptance of his contribution. The same could be said about actual reductions to practice
which, while valid section 102(a) references, might not be public uses within the meaning
of section 102(b). However, to anticipate under section 102(a) the actual reduction must
be publicly accessible, note 12 supra, which frequently will constitute a section 102(b)
public use. Cf. Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333 (1881); Monroe Auto Equipment Co. v.
Heckethorn Mfg. & Supply Co., 332 F.2d 406, 415 (6th Cir. 1954); 1 Drr±ER, WAEMx on
PATENTS § 65 (2d ed. 1964).
43. Courts have always required that, in order to bar, a prior art reference must be
based on certainty and not conjecture. See, e.g., Coffin v. Ogden, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 120, 124
(1873).
44. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
45. Patent fees have recently been increased. 35 U.S.C.A. § 41 (Supp. 1965).
46. 35 U.S.C. § 114 (1964). This statutory provision provides efficient protection against
gross speculation. E.g., Upton v. Ladd, 227 F. Supp. 261 (D.D.C. 1984) (patent denied
when applicant failed to produce model demonstrating operativeness of process). While
some rejections on the ground of inoperativeness are clearly warranted, see, e.g., Ex parte
Payne, 1904 Dec. Cm. Pat. 42, 108 O.G. Pat. Off. 1049 (1903) (perpetual motion machine),
the examiner cannot reject on suspidon of inoperativeness. Ex parte Vang, 72 U.S.P.Q.
188 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1946); Ex parte Amende and Ender, 72 U.S.P.Q. 394 (Pat. Off.
Bd. App. 1944).
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herent voucher of its worth, and is far more likely to be ignored than a
printed publication or patent application. Thus Borst may bar a patent
where the original disclosure made no impression on even the small
audience that it reached.47
These objections to Borst do not mean that its underlying rationale
is unsound. For it clearly would be "illogical" and "anomolous" not to
treat unpublished memoranda as bars to later patents when valuable
information in the memoranda was available to the relevant public,
and thus "known or used by others." This aspect of Borst promotes the
policy of limiting patents to those inventors who develop truly new
and useful contributions. This policy of restricting patents has recently
received strong support from the Supreme Court;48 and properly
qualified, Borst can further this policy while avoiding potentially
adverse effects.
First, the lack of safeguards against irresponsible conjecture implicit
in the Borst-type disclosure should lead courts to hold unpublished
disclosures as § 102(a) bars only if they are "obviously operative"; 40 i.e.,
only if the disclosure is detailed enough to allow a skilled technician
to predict with reasonable certainty that the device will function as
described. Despite this limitation, Borst would still have wide applica-
tion. Written descriptions of many mechanical, electronic, and other
devices, for example, would be able to meet this "obviously operative"
test.50 At the same time, such a test would require that the unpublished
memorandum compensate by internal persuasiveness for the lack of
checks obtained by the other forms of patent bars.
47. Such a result would be undesirable since the prior art is not advanced by the
introduction of a mere speculation which carries with it no certification of operativeness.
A later inventor should not be defeated by speculation, since if he does cause the reduc-
tion to practice of an idea, the operation of which was previously uncertain, he has made
an important contribution. The patent monopoly is granted to induce precisely that kind
of work. Cf., Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 583, 602 (1868). However, 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(f), note 4 supra, precludes awarding a patent to one who appropriates the conception
of another and merely reduces to practice. If he merely receives partial aid, on the other
hand, he is entitled to the award. Polye v. Uhl, 51 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1067, 1073-74, 328
F.2d 893, 898 (1964).
48. Cf., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
49. "Obviously operative" as used here is to be distinguished from the "obvious" test
of invention in 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1964), note 2 supra.
50. See, e.g., THOMAS & AUSLANDER, CHEMICAL INVENTIONS AND CHEMICAL PATENTS §§ 9,
661 (1964). Such devices usually can be analyzed with precision by mathematical techniques.
It is in the case of complex organic chemical processes, the nuclear arts, and highly sophis-
ticated electronics, for example, that operativeness cannot be predicted with certainty,
even though the disclosure, if followed, would result in a reduction to practice. Ibid.
It should be noted that the A.E.C. document in Borst itself would probably not meet the
obviously operative test. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
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Second, a rule must be applied to Borst-type disclosures to define
what level of dissemination these memoranda must meet. The standard
of dissemination applied to an actual reduction to practice can serve
equally well for Borst-disclosures. This standard is simply "non-
secrecy"; 5' if the device is not publicly accessible, it is not "known or
used by others." Since the Borst rule also stems from the "known or
used by others" clause of the statute, the same standard of accessibility
should govern.
Rosaire v. Baroid Sales Division52 illustrates the rule at work. De-
fendant in an infringement suit proved prior knowledge by showing
that an employee of a large corporation had worked on the device. The
Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court's finding that the
knowledge was publically accessible since the reduction to practice had
been performed under ordinary conditions "without any deliberate
attempt at concealment or effort to exclude the public and without
any instructions of secrecy to the employees performing the work."53
Conversely, in Gillman v. Stern, 4 the prior knowledge defense was
rejected because there had been no dissemination of the earlier inven-
tion. Defendant, in challenging a patent, pointed to a earlier machine
built and used by a prior inventor. However, the court noted, no one was
allowed near the machine save for a few trusted employees, who had no
knowledge of how the device worked. Demonstrations of the machine
to prospective purchasers revealed only what it did, not how it worked.
The earlier reduction to practice thus did not bar the later patent, since
the inventor "kept [the construction] of his machine absolutely secret
from the outside world."55
Borst-type disclosures should be held to this non-secret requirement,
if faith is to be kept with the statute. While lack of secrecy does not
insure wide dissemination of a discovery, it does allow some chance
that the discovery will reach those skilled in the art. A stricter test of
dissemination could not be applied to Borst, since any higher level of
dissemination would make the disclosure a publication.50
51. See, eg., Koehring Co. v. National Automatic Tool Co., Inc., - F.2d , (7th
Cir. 1966); Corn Products Co. v. Standard Brands, Inc., 359 F.2d 739, 744 (7th Cir. 1966);
Note, 73 H.av. L. Rrv. 369, 373 (1959).
52. 218 F.2d 72 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 916 (1955).
53. Rosaire v. Baroid Sales Division, 120 F. Supp. 20, 21 (S.D. Tex. 1954).
54. 114 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 718 (1941).
55. 114 F.2d at 31.
56. A higher level of dissemination for actual reductions to practice would be equally
undesirable since it would involve additional expenses for the earlier inventor who has
already absorbed the costs of building and testing. Under this view, a single reduction to
practice for less than three months is an acceptable bar. Brush v. Condit, 132 U.S. 39.
44-46 (1889).
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Finally, courts should interpret Borst to prevent evasion of the time
limit of § 102(b). A possible deterrent to delayed filing which can apply
to unpublished descriptions is suggested by Kear v. Roder.7 That case
held that, in judging priority of invention, the inventor who first
reduced to practice should prevail over an earlier publisher who was
not diligent in reducing to practice.58 If Kear is extended to cover Borst-
type disclosures, an inventor who makes an unpublished disclosure will
still be under pressure to file for a patent promptly, since delay may
mean loss of priority rights."
57. 28 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 774, 115 F.2d 810 (1940).
58. Id. at 786-87, 115 F.2d at 819.
59. Since under Kear a publication is not a reduction to practice and hence is ineffec-
tive to confer priority rights under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g), supra note 4, it would appear that
a Borst-type disclosure suffers from a similar deficiency. While Kear was decided prior
to the codification of the patent laws in 1952, it continues to be the rule under section
102(g). Benton Baker, OUTLINE OF PATENT OFFICE INTERFERENCE PRAcric. 76 (l1th ed.
1964).
